

THE REVOLT

Arguably, I can make an early observation that I made to you relative to George Bush. I believed you made judgments on his intelligence or lack of it, his leaning allegedly on Cheney and others, possibly an acceptance of poor advice and a myriad of things that seem to tell you he was not up to the job. I countered with the obvious that you were not really privy to how he thinks and how he operates and you did not sit in the meetings when decisions were made. Too, you ask me to comment on why these Generals are now coming forward and pushing for his relief. We do not know what they collectively tried to convince Rumsfeld to do, that he didn't do or failed to listen or dismissed their ideas. General DeLong and Franks believed he listened and questioned and rehashed. Myers supported him as astute and one who listens contemplates and decides. We can look at a few things.

Anthony Zinni, the 4 star Marine, who commanded Central Command after Swartzkopf and before Franks and served as a Bush trouble-shooter in the attempt to get Arafat and Sharon to get going on the Roadmap to peace. In 2002-before we invaded Iraq-he laid out his treatise on why we should assess seriously the argument for invading Iraq: -another questionable war or operation like Vietnam. His argument: deviation from the terrorist campaign, stir up the rest of the arab mideast, detour from Road Map to peace, pre-emption not our way, spread too thin, etal and he cited McNamara whose 'Retrospect' "we made an error in judgment and capability"- (disrespect for \$68,000 dead/350,000 wounded). He hoped he was wrong.

General Haig argued we must take the battle to the enemy but cautioned that we needed more troops especially for the aftermath of the opening attacks which in short order defeated the inept Iraqi military. Haig said this was foretold after the first Gulf War but he reminded we do not occupy well and hearts and minds dilemma. McCaffrey, the hero of the turning movement in Gulf One. His 24th Mech was pretty-much in a position to destroy the Republican Guard before it escaped. He argued about too few troops, and the mistakes made by the civilian control hqs. He liked what he saw later. Of course, Wes Clark, the opportunist, who was relieved by Secretary Cohen on the advice of Chairman Shelton who questioned his integrity and character. He offers little because of his 'intelligence' kind of like Carter and Clinton who mucked all this up earlier.

As you know Colonel, if one does not agree with the boss he can restate his case in stronger terms and amplify why he believes as he does. If the boss says 'your points General make some sense but I have decided to do A,B and C' If the one arguing his point of view believes so strongly that he cannot accept it he can ask for a transfer, resign or continue to talk and possibly be relieved. All of these Generals probably served well-the ones on TV-but differed with the concept believing: too few troops, too early with civilian control, should have cleared out the Sunni areas totally, and never released the Iraqi military to go home and grouse. And, of course, someone should

have thought about a total strategy like WWII -un-conditional surrender(the japanese and german were totally beaten and there were no vestige of an insurgency). Perhaps in retrospect had their been a real un-dercurrent of trouble, they should have brought it to Abazid, Casey, and laid it out in detail; euphoria over the initial attack almost in replica of Gulf one lulled everyone to sleep and they fell into false assumptions and occupying trauma that became the albatross. Learning from the Jew who never lost a battle or war to the Arab suffered by Infitada more yet handled it better. We should have assumed this was the only strategy the arab and the growing Jihad could use since a conventional battle was a no win thing. Militant Islam(Wahhabism)should have dictated a new strategy as the 9/11 commission argued.

I should have referred you to my manuscript as I take you and others along the path of potential victory and all our mistakes in Gulf one and two. In my book (the third one) on VN I mention in the end of the last chapter "to die in these wars, Korea and Vietnam was reprehensible". So we always find fault and we are often caught in the dilemma of loyalty, the good soldier, and often get caught in prostituting our principles. We shut up too soon but then we believe as I often did we can change things from within rather than out. Hackworth and Herbert whom I talk about in my books were great soldiers and got out and bad-mouthed everyone. It is a problem for all of us who are dedicated soldiers.

Coincidentally, I just sent a msg to you and the other two I sent my manuscript to with a slap on the wrist tempered with your own agendas, perhaps not too impressed with it, or other reasons. I know John you have been through several operations, etal. I did pay you all my respect . Read manuscript conclusions!

To know Bush, get Bill Sammon's 'Strategery' an excellent run-down of the man and his mission -his mental and physical toughness and how he continues to thwart the critics, especially democrats. Like Reagan he is probably 'an amiable dunce' as well as a 'simpering fool'; both may grow and be placed at the top of Presidents when Carter, Clinton and others fall into the ashes/dregs of history.